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Abstract—In this paper we describe a technique for automatic 
algorithm identification and information extraction from 
unknown binaries.   We emulate the binary using PyEmu forcing 
complete code coverage whilst simultaneously examining its 
behavior. Our behavior matcher then identifies specific 
algorithmic behavior and extracts information.  We demonstrate 
the use of this technique for automated extraction of encryption 
keys from an unseen program with no prior knowledge about its 
implementation.  Our technique can also be used for automatic 
categorization and suggestion of function purpose to analysts. 
Keywords: binary analysis, encryption key extraction, 
behavioural analysis. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Software is often written by a programmer in a high-level 
language which is then compiled into machine code (a binary) 
for execution on the system.  Software is then distributed in 
binary form without the original high-level source code.  This 
process of conversion (compilation) from a high-level 
language to a binary is a lossy process.  Comments, structure 
naming, code layout are all lost in this conversion process as 
they only serve to aid computer programmers in reading the 
code and are not required for execution. 
 
Binary analysis is used to discover the function of software 
after compilation to detect security holes or verify the software 
performs as intended (verification).  As key information used 
by humans to decipher code is removed, the task of binary 
analysis is exceptionally time consuming.  Often optimized 
sections of code bear little resemblance to the high level code 
typed by the programmer – requiring the analyst to 
painstakingly examine the assembly code line by line. 
 
The binary analysis task is further obstructed because it is not 
trivial to recognize common code such as that in statically 
linked libraries.  Tools such as IDA Pro [1] have made some 
efforts to tackle this problem by compiling a database of 
library function fingerprints; however, a new or obfuscated 
version will fail recognition.  Further consider two 
programmers who implement the RC4 [2] encryption 
algorithm, both programmer’s code behaves the same but they 
may be coded in radically different ways. 
 
Consider now the task of trying to discover an encryption key 
embedded in a program or stored in a running process’s 
memory dump.   Unless the encryption algorithm 
implementation is previously known it is a slow and painful 
task of binary analysis to identify where the key is stored.   
 
In this paper, we set out a method of recognizing code based 
on its behaviour and apply it to a number of different 
implementations of the RC4 encryption.  Instead of examining 
the compiled instructions and trying to perform a pattern 
match, we examine the behaviour, the net effect of the 
instructions and pattern match against this.  This enables 
matching regardless of the particular implementation choices 
or style of the programmer and also allows matches where 
code has been obfuscated.  We then go on to show that it is 
possible to automatically recover the key without prior 
knowledge of the particular implementation. 
 
We envisage that this technique will not only be used by 
binary analysts to extract keys from static binaries but also by 
forensics analysts to extract encryption keys from process 
memory dumps acquired through a cold memory attack [3].  
Forensics is often hindered or completely obstructed by the 
use of cryptography but the approach presented in this paper 
paves the way for automatic extraction of encryption keys 
from a system/process memory dump. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
Anti-virus software uses signatures as a tool in its arsenal to 
recognise known viruses by storing stub instruction 
combinations; however, this is fraught with difficulty [4] as 
viruses often ‘evolve’ or use complicated polymorphic 
obfuscation techniques [5].  Therefore, anti-virus has evolved 
to examine behaviour of viruses through monitoring API calls. 
Wagener [6] proposes use of a phylogenetic tree to identify 
behaviours of similar malware based on the system and API 
calls they make.  Identifying malware by its API call 
behaviour is a common technique but using the same 
technique to detect algorithmic behaviour is fraught with 
difficulty.  
 
Rhee [7] proposes profiling the data object access behaviour 
of malware and using this information to identify it.  He 
applies the technique to detecting rootkits and claims no false 
positives on uncompromised kernels.  Their work has some 
small similarities with ours to the extent that we do not 
examine API calls, except our focus is identifying specific 
algorithmic behaviour and then extracting encryption keys 
whereas they focus on producing better malware signatures. 
 
There has been a substantial body of work on identifying and 
automatically unpacking malware regardless of the packing 
technique used.  Omniunpack [8] and PolyUnpack [9] assume 
that packers have fairly similar behaviour characterised by, for 
example, execution of a dynamicly generated memory page 
allowing identification of the unpacker and entry point. Lyda 
[10] proposes identifying packed executables based on the 
level of entropy in their code section.  Code sections typically 
have low entropy whereas packed code often appears to be 
random.  This technique could be used to identify code which 
changes the entropy of memory, allowing for the potential 
identification of code sections that employ cryptography; 
however, manual analysis would still be required for specific 
algorithm determination and key extraction. 
 
Our work is similar to that on detecting and automatically 
extracting packed malware to the extent that we exmaine non-
API call behaviors; however, our approach is generalizable to 
a wide spectrum of algorithms and behaviours located 
anywhere within the binary. 
III. BINARYMO - BEHAVIOURAL ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
In this section we present BinaryMO, our binary behaviour 
analyzer.  We describe the techniques used for recognizing 
functionality in an executable without consideration to the 
specific implementation choices.  This technique is able to 
identify algorithms, such as encryption, regardless of the finer 
details of their implementation. 
 
BinaryMO emulates a program and analyzes the behaviour of 
the code rather than the particular way in which it was 
implemented.  We then use a set of algorithms to detect 
particular behaviours and then extract any required 
information.  For emulation we use the PyEmu x86-32 
emulator for Python [11].  PyEmu provides an emulated CPU, 
paged memory and limited system call emulation.  PyEmu 
also provides us with the ability to step through binaries one 
instruction at a time hooking memory access, register access, 
individual instructions, etc. PyEmu’s CPU emulator is mostly 
complete but omits a number of instructions used in some 
binaries we analysed (namely 8-bit operations) – we have 
therefore implemented these instructions and will contribute 
our additions freely.  But, we caution other researchers that 
some of the instructions omitted do not cause PyEmu to throw 
an exception but are silently ignored. 
 
If one starts with the executable to be analysed, the executable 
file can be broken into two main sections: data and code.  
Each section must be loaded into memory at the specified 
address and the executable must be linked with the desired 
libraries. Alternatively, if we are using a forensic memory 
dump then this will be loaded verbatim into memory and the 
process context used to initialise registers and the instruction 
pointer.  The code section is then scanned for call instructions 
and the call address noted in a symbol table.  This provides us 
with a list of functions within the program and their respective 
offset.  We then emulate the program aiming for complete 
code coverage whilst allowing a set of behaviour modules to 
match desired traits.  As soon as complete coverage is 
achieved, the program terminates. 
 
If code coverage is incomplete and the program enters a large 
loop or exits, it may become necessary to intervene.  At this 
stage, we build a tree of function calls in the binary with the 
tree head as the entry point.  We then build a list of the 
unexecuted functions ordered by their depth in the tree 
(ignoring children of unexecuted functions).  We examine the 
references to each function and attempt to extract static 
parameters and dynamic values that might have been 
determined during prior emulation.   Where this fails to 
determine a parameter, a dummy value is inserted after type 
determination.  Each function is then emulated in turn as 
illustrated in Figure 1 and the process is repeated if code 
coverage is still incomplete. 
 
 
 
 
Next, the analyzer will load a library of code matching 
modules for the particular functionality the analyst is looking 
for.  Each module will have three components: 
 
Trigger: The purpose of the trigger is to identify code that 
MAY be what this module is looking for.  It will often look at 
the initial behaviour from an algorithm and trigger the 
confirmatory stage.  The reason for separating the trigger and 
confirmation is one of overhead – emulation is slow and 
overly onerous matching will slow down performance 
substantially.  The trigger acts as flag, flagging up interesting 
code and encouraging analysts to produce simple triggers. 
 
Confirmation: The confirmation section will confirm that the 
code is that which we are looking for.  At this stage, it can 
either identify the code to the analyst or if it is likely the 
analyst will desire particular information from the code (such 
as keys) then it will move to the extraction stage. 
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Figure 1: Forced execution determination 
Extraction: If called by the confirmatory stage then this part 
will either continue execution to acquire the relevant 
information or examine the emulation log to extract it. 
 
Figure 2 gives an overview of how the components of the 
behavioural analyzer fit together. 
 
 
 
 
There are evidently some important points to this approach 
that require consideration, as follows: 
 
1. Code coverage: As we force code coverage when it is 
not achieved readily we inevitably put some functions 
into unexpected states; analysts should bear this in mind 
when developing matchers.  Ideally, we will be matching 
algorithmic behaviour rather than tracking stack variable 
contents. 
2. Code linearity: When an algorithm is divided across a 
number of functions, the analyzer depends on the 
functions being executed in sequence to provide a 
positive match.  This is likely to happen in all cases but 
is wholly dependent on the intelligence of the code 
coverage functionality.  We believe the forced execution 
tree described above mitigates this problem as best as 
possible. 
3. Library calls: It is often undesirable to execute library 
calls particularly from malicious code.   Where possible, 
the call is either emulated or replaced with a stub.  The 
latter has the effect of changing the behaviour of an 
algorithm if it is dependent on library call and therefore 
we discourage the use of this approach where this is the 
case. 
 
In the next section, we provide an example of matching the 
RC4 algorithm with high probability and extracting the 
encryption key. 
IV.  BINARYMO: AUTOMATED RC4 KEY EXTRACTION 
We apply the behavioural analysis technique to the RC4 
algorithm [2] to automatically extract the encryption key.  We 
have chosen RC4 because of its simplicity for the purposes of 
demonstration; however, the behavioural technique is 
applicable to any other cipher. 
 
The RC4 algorithm consists of two parts: A key scheduling 
algorithm whose purpose is to turn an encryption key, K, into 
a randomly ordered initial permutation S of  0, … ,   1 	, 
and a key stream output part which uses this permutation to 
generate the pseudo-random key stream sequence. 
 
The algorithm first initializes S to the ordered set  0, … ,  
1 	, and then initializes i and j to zero.  The algorithm loops N 
times incrementing i as a counter, and incrementing j pseudo-
randomly based upon the key.  For each iteration, 
 and 

 are swapped resulting in a pseudo-random shuffle of S 
based upon the key.  The algorithm then goes on to enter a 
second loop, iterating once for each key stream byte.  In each 
iteration, the algorithm selects an entry from S pseudo-
randomly and performs one additional swap. 
 
The algorithm is set out in Figure 4 with all variables modulo 
N. 
 
 
Key Scheduling Algorithm 
(KSA) 
 
Initialization 
S = {0, …, N – 1} 
i = j = 0 
 
Key-based shuffle 
For i = 0 … N – 1 
j = j + S[i]  
+ K[i mod Klen] 
Swap S[i], S[j] 
Pseudo Random Generation 
Algorithm (PRGA) 
 
Initialization 
i = j = 0 
 
 
Output Loop 
i = i + 1 
j = j + S[i] 
Swap S[i], S[j] 
Output S[S[i] + S[j]] 
Figure 3: RC4 Stream Cipher 
 
Our goal is to automatically identify either K or 
, , 	  after 
recognising the algorithm in the binary.  K is the Holy Grail, 
with which we should be able to decrypt all data; 
, , 	 
would allow us to decrypt future data and make it substantially 
easier to work backward (vs. no knowledge).  Strictly a 
program does not require K after initialisation of RC4 but it is 
rarely discarded because typical implementations frequently 
re-initialised RC4 with a different initialization vector (K + 
IV).  For example, the Wireless Equivalence Protocol would 
both change the initialization key of RC4 frequently based on 
the original key. 
 
We first need to identify particular behaviours which are 
characteristic of RC4 and not easily obfuscated by 
programmers or compiler optimisation.  The code in Figure 3 
is a fairly typical implementation and is already optimised.  
The initialization of S to the ordered set  0, … ,   1 	  is a 
prime target for detecting the start of RC4 (a trigger); 
however, this could be obfuscated by initializing S in some 
other order than linearly ascending; however, regardless the 
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Figure 2: Behavioural analyzer overview 
behaviour is a series of log  log 2⁄  sized writes in a block S 
of size N where the write value compiles with the following 
(after all writes complete): 
 
 
  
, 
  1   
   1: (1)  
 
Therefore, we select this as our trigger – the first part of the 
initialisation of S. As N is almost always 256 it makes it trivial 
to write a memory write hook to detect this behaviour.  Whilst 
processor architecture may dictate a different write size, the 
net effect of each write will always be a single byte change in 
memory and so our hook should look for behaviour where the 
net effect is a single byte write.  
 
Once the trigger has identified the code as a potential RC4 
algorithm, we enter the next stage, confirmation and key 
extraction.  To confirm this code is indeed RC4, we hook 
memory and look for a series of 2N read and writes in the 
same N sized block as the trigger.  By limiting our hook to the 
N sized block, we eliminate the appearance of read/writes to 
temporary variables that may be used.  Once confirmed, we 
compare the values of the read and writes – the read and write 
values must perform a swap inside S.  Although the order may 
vary, the sequence is likely to appear as two reads followed by 
two writes as follows: 
 
  
  READ 

  READ 

    WRITE 

    WRITE 
(2)  
 
If one then extracts the offset into S for each read and write, 
we will see that there will be two sets of numbers, where the 
value of the first set increments linearly to N – 1 and the other 
set increments pseudo-randomly.  These offsets represent i and 
j respectively. This gives a confirmation of RC4 KSA 
completion.  Knowledge of both i and j for the execution of 
this KSA shuffle allows us to calculate the key.  For each 
series of two reads and two writes, where ji denotes the value 
of j at iteration i, one calculates the key as follows (all 
variables modulo N) using the value of S before the swap 
writes: 
 
0   (3)  
 
      
 (4)  
 
Given the set K, one can then determine the key length, Klen, 
by identifying the repeating sequence length and then extract 
the key 0 . . .  !"#    1. 
 
An alternative approach would be to locate the key in memory 
or a processor register, but given that there are several places 
the key could be stored and then subsequently manipulated we 
would need to implement recognition algorithms for each.  By 
calculating the key from i and j during the KSA shuffle our 
technique is not concerned with the location of the key but 
determined from the behaviour of the code – essentially 
abstracting us another layer from the implementation choices 
of the programmer. 
V. EVALUATION 
To evaluate our approach for key extraction, we took a variety 
of RC4 implementations.  The implementation in Figure 4 
below was taken from the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) Cyber Security challenge [12]: a binary 
analysis challenge set by one of Britain’s intelligence agencies 
which uses RC4 to obfuscate data in the program.  
 
 x86 assembly Comments 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
ksainit: 
mov [esp+ecx],cl 
inc cl 
jnz ksa_part1_loop 
 
xor eax,eax 
 
mov edx,0xdeadbeef 
 
ksa_key_loop:    
add al,[esp+ecx]; 
add al,dl        
ror edx,0x8      
mov bl,[esp+ecx] 
mov bh,[esp+eax] 
mov [esp+eax],bl 
mov [esp+ecx],bh 
inc cl 
jnz ksa_key_loop 
 
S[i] = i 
i++ 
 
 
 
 
The key 
 
 
j += S[i] 
j += K[i mod len] 
Next byte from key 
Read S[i] 
Read S[j] 
Write S[j] 
Write S[i] 
i++ 
Figure 4: RC4 assembly code 
 
The profile of this code in terms of read and writes is that the 
ksainit function performs the initial S fill exactly as described 
in the last section and correctly triggers the confirmation and 
extraction stage. The ksa_key_loop function performs the 
KSA shuffle; however, it performs an extra read on line 11 but 
because our behaviour analyser is configured to ignore 
identical sequential read/writes forcing conformation with 
behaviour profile. 
 
In Figure 5, we illustrate the actions of the memory hook once 
the extraction stage has begun.  The analyser splits the 
sequence of reads and writes into blocks representing the 
iterations of the KSA shuffle and then extracts i and j. The 
calculations outlined earlier are then used to extract the 
0xDEADBEEF key as follows: 
 
Action Offset Value 
Read 
Read 
Read 
Write 
Write 
00h 
00h 
EFh 
EFh 
00h 
00h 
00h 
EFh 
00h 
EFh 
  0 
  $%&  0  0  0 
0  '(& 
Read 
Read 
Read 
Write 
Write 
01h 
01h 
AEh 
AEh 
01h 
01h 
01h 
AEh 
01h 
AEh 
  0 
  )$&  0  
1  1 
1  )$&  0  
1  *'& 
Figure 5: Read / write memory hook 
 
In Figure 5, both i and j are inferred from the memory offset 
relative to the start of S.  As i always begins at zero and j is 
always based on the key it is possible to determine which read 
and write are responsible for each. In this example, the 
technique extracts EFh and BEh, the first two bytes of the key, 
and if allowed to run for an additional two iterations would 
have extracted ADh and then DEh, revealing the complete 
key. 
 
As discussed earlier, the key has been extracted from the 
behaviour of the algorithm rather than locating it in the edx 
register.  By doing this, we ensure the technique is applicable 
regardless of where the programmer chooses to store the key. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented a general framework for behavioural 
analysis of algorithmic behaviour in binaries.  We have then 
used this approach to automatically extract the key from a 
variety of RC4 implementations. 
 
There are two threads to our future work.  The first is applying 
the approach to other cipher algorithms so it is possible to 
extract keys from more than just RC4.  We will also 
investigate whether it is possible to produce a behavioural 
matcher for a generalised class of ciphers (e.g. feistal block 
ciphers).  The second strand to our future work is extracting 
keys from memory dumps obtained through cold-boot attacks 
– specifically we will first reconstruct the virtual memory 
from the page tables and then perform an automated analysis 
of the program to identify the key in a similar way to outlined 
in this paper.  We also envisage that this technique can be used 
to automatically profile a program and suggest to the binary 
analyst what the behaviour of each function may be (e.g. 
HTTP request, etc) and even categorise functions 
automatically.   
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